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1. Introduction 
In February 2005, the then Home Secretary Charles Clarke 
outlined a “five year plan” aimed at changing fundamentally 
the way immigration to the United Kingdom is managed. 
Central to this plan is the adoption of a “points-based 
system” (PBS), where applicants are allotted points or 
“scored” for possessing human capital characteristics that 
make them more employable, such as education, technical 
skills, and work experience. If some threshold level of 
points is achieved (which can be varied), then the 
individual is entered into a pool of individuals who will 
eventually be allowed to immigrate to the UK (usually 
conditional on satisfactory security and medical checks). 
With such a system the policy shifts away from matching 
“jobs to people” to matching “people to jobs”. Such a shift is 
desirable since immigration can be used to strategically fill 
job vacancies and help plug skills gaps caused by 
population ageing and labour force decline. Although the 
UK Government has tended to portray this system as new 
and novel, it is not—it it is a minor variant of the system 
introduced in Canada in 1967 and copied by Australia in 
1973. What does this new system mean for Scotland, a 
country with a government committed to maintaining 
historical high levels of net-migration? 
 
2. UK Points-based immigration system 
The UK PBS will eventually replace the system that 
includes over 80 ways to immigrate to the UK. The old 
system is clearly idiosyncratic, if not ad hoc, and is both 
inefficient and expensive to administer. The new system 
consists of five “Tiers”, with each tier focussing on a 
different type or class of immigrants. The basic structure   
is summarised in Table 1. The “Tier 1 General immigrant” 
category is aimed at allowing high-skill individuals to come 
to the United Kingdom to look for work or self-employment. 
Such an individual does not need an employment offer. 
Likewise, an individual intending to be self-employed does 
not need to present a detailed business plan. Such 
individuals when they apply to immigrate are given points 
for educational qualifications, previous earnings, United 
Kingdom experience and age. It is worth noting that “Tier 3” 
of the UK PBS is currently suspended. This Tier is aimed at 
the management of lower- and low-skill immigration. 
However, no date has been given for when this part of 
system will be re-introduced.  In fact there is very little 
discussion of this and the focus is on rolling out the 
remaining tiers to plan. Although few politicians will admit it, 
their expectation is that immigrants from those mainly 
central and eastern countries that joined the European 
Union in 2004 (the so-called “A8 countries”) will continue to 
be the main source of low-skill immigration, with Poland 
being the biggest single source. 
 
At the moment, an individual wishing to immigrate to the 
UK must score at least 75 points to “jump” the first hurdle. 
In addition, the individual needs to fulfill an “English 
language requirement”.  In order to “jump” this second 
hurdle, a relatively high standard of written and spoken 
English is required i.e. a “Band 6” score on the 
International English Language Testing System (IELTS) or 
a degree from an English-language institution of higher 
education. A Band 6 IELTS score is similar to what most 
higher education institutions in Scotland require from 
students whose first language is not English. It is hard to 
judge whether 75 points is a high or low threshold. The 
system has not been up and running for very long and to 
date little data has been made available to (non-
government) researchers. However, our analysis of both 
the Canadian and Australian systems suggests that this 
threshold is indeed high, especially when it is coupled with 
a far from trivial English language requirement. 
 
Will the introduction of this points system lead to lower 
levels of immigration to the UK? The answer to this 
question is a clear “maybe”. It all depends on whether the 
75 points hurdle is increased or decreased in the future. If it 
is increased, then immigration will decrease. If it is 
decreased, then immigration will increase. In this sense, 
the hurdle is like a price with the government acting like a 
monopoly setting price to generate a certain quantity. 
Therefore people who have concluded that the introduction 
of a PBS in the UK will lower immigration levels are wrong. 
To illustrate this point, we can consider what happened in 
Canada. In September 2003, the Canadian government 
lowered the minimum points needed from 75 to 67, in order 
to meet higher immigration targets. Given the nature of the 
system, most commentators concluded that this change 
was a sizeable reduction, with the result (somewhat 
unsurprisingly) being that immigration levels were higher in 
subsequent years. 
 
Our view is that the minimum number of points in order to 
be eligible to immigrate to the UK will be increased in the 
future. This will make the UK an even more difficult country 
to immigrate to for people outside the EU. In the last 
national election, all three major political parties committed 
themselves to reducing immigration levels “if elected”. It 
seems likely that in next spring’s national election, 
immigration policy will be even more central. It is not 
difficult to understand why the main political parties are 
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Table 1:  Summary of structure of the UK points-based immigration system (PBS) 
 
 
Tier Statement of intent Applications open 
Tier 1:  General 
Tier 1:  General (India) 
Tier 1:  General (Worldwide) 
Tier 1:  Investors 
Tier 1:  Entrepreneurs 
Tier 1:  Post-study 
 
7 December 2007 
7 December 2007 
7 December 2007 
7 December 2007 
7 December 2007 
 
30 June 2008 
30 June 2008 
30 June 2008 
30 June 2008 
30 June 2008 
 
Tier 2:  Skilled workers with a job offer 
 
March 2008 27 November 2008 
Tier 3:  Limited numbers of  low skilled workers needed to fill temporary 
labour shortages  
 
This tier is currently 
suspended 
 
Tier 4:  Students 
 
Due March 2008 March 2009 
Tier 5:  Youth mobility and temporary workers Due March 2008 27 November 2008 
 
 
Source:  Home Office Border and Immigration Agency 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Maximum points – Canada and Quebec immigration systems 
 
Characteristic Canada Quebec 
Education 25 11 
Employment experience 21 10 
Arranged employment 10 15 
Age 10 10 
Language 24 24 
English 16 (8) 6 
French 8 (16) 18 
Adaptability 10 10 
Total 100 80 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Inter-provincial migration rates – foreign-born versus native-born Canadians 
 
 5-year rate 
Census Native-born Foreign-born p-value 
2001 3.5% 2.8% <0.01 
1991 4/1% 4.1% <0.01 
1981 5.3% 5.3% <0.01 
 1-year rate 
Census Native-born Foreign-born p-value 
2001 1.0% 0.8% <0.01 
1991 1.3% 1.0% <0.01 
    
 
 
Note:       It is not possible to calculate the 1-year rate for 1981 since the necessary quetion was not asked on this census. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations 
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Table 4:  Inter-provincial migration rates – immigrant cohort and matched samples – 2001 Canadian census 
 
Rate Census Cohort Immigrant cohort 
sample 
Matched 
sample 
p-value 
      
5-year rate 2001 1996 6.2% 4.1% <0.01 
1-year rate* 2001 2000 2.4% 1.4% 0.05 
 
  
Notes: 1996 (2000) cohort includes immigrants who first obtained landed immigrant status between January 1, 1996 (2000) and May 15, 
 1996 (2000) 
 Number of immigrants = 1,989 (5-year); 2,365 (1-year) 
 Number of matches = 350,387 (5-year); 530,940 (1-year) 
 Number of draws = 500 
 (*) does not include Atlantic Canada or the Territories 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations 
 
concerned with immigration. Immigration to the UK has 
increased sharply over the past decade and is now at a 
historically high level. Furthermore, the bulk of immigrants 
still settle in London and the South-east of England. This is 
also the part of the country where anti-immigration 
sentiment is growing. It also happens to be the area of the 
country where General Elections tend to be won or lost 
given about 25 per cent of the UK population is 
concentrated there. 
 
What does all this mean for Scotland?  The question then 
becomes how does one increase immigration to Scotland 
(as the Scottish Government appears to want) and at the 
same time reduce immigration to the United Kingdom (as 
UK Government appears to want)? At first these policy 
objectives may appear to be totally incompatible. 
Immigration policy is set for the UK “as a whole” by the UK 
Government and any policy that reduces immigration to the 
UK “as a whole” will also reduce immigration to Scotland. 
This will certainly be true unless immigrants to the UK are 
required to reside and work in a particular region for a 
minimum period of time. However, there is nothing in the 
points-based system that takes into consideration the 
different demographic conditions that exist across the UK.   
 
 
3. Adding regionality to immigration policy 
Regional differences are a key feature of Canadian 
immigration policy. These differences are reflected in the 
immigration system. All the ten provinces of Canada (and 
one of its three territories) have agreements with the 
federal (Ottawa) government relating to immigration which 
takes into consideration specific provincial (territorial) 
requirements. Beginning in the late 1990s, “Provincial 
Nominee Programmes” (PNPs) have been established. 
PNPs are negotiated agreements that essentially mean 
that responsibility for immigration is shared between the 
provincial and federal governments. Similar agreements 
exist between the territorial and federal governments in 
Australia, although regionality is less central in Australian 
immigration policy. 
In practise these programmes mean that applicants with 
certain skills face a lower immigration threshold if they 
agree to live, work and stay in a particular province/territory 
for a minimum period of time.  This minimum period of time 
is often 1,095 days of residence, which is also what is 
needed to be eligible for Canadian citizenship. Once 
citizenship is obtained (or the minimum period expires), the 
individual can reside anywhere in Canada. One of the main 
reasons PNPs were introduced was to counter the 
historical tendency of immigrants to concentrate in the 
three main cities of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. 
They are based on the empirical regularity that once an 
immigrant arrives in one province, after two years of 
residence, the probability of moving to another province 
drops off considerably. In other words, if you get people to 
a particular region in the first place, there is a high 
probability that they will stay permanently. 
The Canada-Quebec Accord (CQA) goes one step further 
and essentially devolves responsibility for immigration to 
the province of Quebec. In this arrangement, potential 
immigrants apply directly to the Province of Quebec and 
not the Dominion of Canada. The CQA is also a points-
based system. However, the weighting is different, as is 
shown in Table 2. Essentially the CQA system awards 
fewer points for education/qualifications/employability and 
more points for knowledge of the French language. 
Quebec “picks” the immigrants and the federal government 
issues the visas and work permits, and administers the 
medical and criminal background checks. 
 
The UK PBS could easily and quickly be modified along 
these lines to meet Scotland’s needs by allotting more 
points to applicants who agree to live, work and stay in 
Scotland. Immigrants who choose this option could be 
issued with a visa that states that they are only allowed to 
work in Scotland. The period of this permit should be the 
same amount of time needed to applying for citizenship, 
which can be varied.  This simple modification will only 
work if the government is serious about enforcing the terms 
of the residence requirement. Those who fail to do so
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Figure 1:  Five-year inter-provincial migration rate - 2001 Canadian Census 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  One-year inter-provincial migration rate (%) - 2001 Canadian Census 
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would have their work permit revoked and would no longer 
have the right to work. Since a “deal is a deal”, the 
government must be prepared, as a last resort, to deport 
those who fail to live up to the agreement. Given the UK 
Government has promised to be “tougher” on refugees and 
asylum seekers in terms of enforcing deportation orders (and 
numbers are falling), this does not seem to be a massive leap 
forward in “policy”. 
 
 
4. Do provincial nominee programmes work? 
It is often argued that one reason for not devolving 
responsibly for immigration to Scotland is that Provincial 
Nominee Programmes “don’t work” in the sense that people 
do not stay in the province or territory they agreed to 
immigrate to. At face value, this seems unlikely since the 
sanctions are considerable for breaking the immigration 
contract. However, if it was true, then we would expect to see 
high rates of interprovincial migration in the years immediately 
after arrival. This of course is a legitimate question that could 
be answered empirically. However, in our search through the 
literature, we found no studies that specifically addressed this 
issue. We did however find a number of studies that 
demonstrate that the inter-provincial migration behaviour of 
native-born and foreign-born Canadians is surprisingly similar 
(e.g. Edmonston, 2002; Finnie, 2000; Lin, 1998; Newfold, 
1996; Nogle, 1994; Robinson and Tomes, 1982). 
 
In order to address this issue more directly we have analysed 
micro-data collected in the 1981, 1991 and 2001 Canadian 
censuses. Questions were asked about where respondents 
lived one and five years earlier so it is possible to calculate 
inter-provincial migration rates for native-born and foreign-
born individuals.  In 2001, there were few Provincial Nominee 
Programmes up and running although the separate system for 
Quebec had been in place for a decade. In this sense we   are 
effectively considering what can be termed the “before period” 
when PNPs were not a central feature of Canadian 
immigration policy. In our future work, we will compare this to 
the “after period” with data from the 2006 Census (once it 
becomes available). 
 
These calculations are summarised in Table 3. Three points 
are worth noting. In all comparisons, the rate of inter-
provincial migration is higher for native-born Canadians and 
this difference is highly statistically significant. The second is 
that the rate for both of them has declined over time. The third 
is that 2001 5-year rates of 2.8% and 3.5% and 1-year rates 
of 0.8% and 1.0% do not seem especially large. In addition, 
as is shown in Figures 1 and 2, the inter-provincial migration 
rate is much higher for native-born Canadians in the younger 
age groups.  
 
It is also possible with census data to calculate inter-provincial 
migration rates for specific cohorts of immigrants since the 
year of immigration is also collected. With the 2001 census, 
we have calculated the 5-year migration rate for the cohort 
who immigrated in 1996 and the 1-year rate for the cohort 
who immigrated in 2000. These rates provide a more detailed 
picture in the period immediately after arrival. However, there 
is no natural comparison group since there is no cohort of 
“non-immigrants”. On their own such rates do not have much 
meaning. In attempt to provide a comparator, matching 
methods are used (see Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997, 
1998a, 1998b). Space does not allow for a detailed discussion 
of these methods but the basic idea is simple. You select a 
set of characteristics that are thought to be correlated with 
migrating. Our list included: age, sex, marital status, 
education, presence of children and province/territory of 
residence. For every immigrant in the same sample you select 
a native-born individual with the same characteristics. You 
then calculate the difference in the migration rates between 
the two groups. The approach is quasi-experimental in the 
sense that the immigrants make up the “treatment group” 
while the matched sample of hypothetical individuals make up 
the “control group”.  
The results based on the 2001 census are shown in Table 4. 
For the 1996 immigrant cohort, the percentage that had 
moved province five years later was 6.2%. This rate is higher 
than the rate for the matched sample rate of 4.1%. This 
difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.  For 
the 2000 immigrant cohort, the percentage who had moved 
province one year later was 2.4%. This rate is again higher 
that the rate for the matched sample rate of 1.4%. However 
this difference is only statistically significant at the 5 per cent 
level. Taken at face value, these rates do not seem “high” 
remembering that there will be few PNP immigrants in these 
cohorts. 
 
5. Concluding comments 
As it stands at the moment, there is absolutely nothing in the 
UK points-based system that will make it easier for the 
Scottish Government to deliver on its promise of reversing 
Scotland’s population decline. There is nothing in it that will 
attract people to Scotland. The Government’s electoral 
promise to reduce immigration to the UK will also reduce 
immigration to Scotland.  It is somewhat surprising that the 
UK Government praises the Canadian and Australian 
immigration systems yet at the same times ignores the fact 
that regionality is a cornerstone of both. Scottish specificity 
could easily be built in through bonus points or lower 
thresholds for those who agree to live, work and stay in 
Scotland for a minimum period of time. Or the responsibility 
for immigration could be transferred to the Scottish 
Government along the lines of the Canada-Quebec Accord. In 
fact, points-based systems with regionality operate better than 
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country-wide systems. Systems of the later type simply attract 
immigrants to areas with high immigrant concentrations, since 
chain migration is a feature of unrestricted or unmanaged 
migration flows. In this sense, modifying the UK PBS is not a 
situation of applying principles that are in any sense “new and 
unproven”—it is only a matter of political will.   
 
 
____________________ 
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